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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent decisions in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB,' Hammermill
Paper Co. v. NLRB, 2 and C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB 3 represent a departure
from prior case law4 concerning an employer's disparate treatment of a union
steward5 for engaging in a prohibited strike to the same extent as rank-and-file
employees. In these three cases the employers' more serious discipline of a
union steward was found to be a violation of section 8(a)(3) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended. The courts concluded that more severe
punishment meted out to union stewards than to rank-and-file employees
participating in similar unprotected activity 7 would be illegal unless the em-
ployment contract specifically provided for a higher duty of the union
steward.8 In the earlier case of Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB, 9
1. 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
2. 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981).
3. 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).
4. Gould Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Indiana & Mich.
Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
5. "Union steward," for purposes of this Comment, may be defined as follows:
The union representative of a group of fellow workers who carries out union duties in the plant or
shop, for instance handling grievances, collecting dues, recruiting new members. Elected by union
members in the plant or appointed by higher union officials, the shop steward usually continues to
work at his or her regular job and handles union duties only on a part-time basis.
R. DOHERTY, INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS TERMS: A GLOSSARY 27 (ILR Bulletin No. 44, 1979)
(italics omitted).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
7. Unprotected concerted activity is employee activity that is not included in the catalogue of protected
activities set forth in § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. A. COX, D. BOK, R. GORMAN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 822-25 (9th ed. 1981). For the text of § 7, see infra note 16. Professors Cox, Bok,
and Gorman indicate that the Board and courts have assumed the task of drawing the distinction between
protected and unprotected activity, and "although a strike during the term of a labor contract, in violation of a
no-strike clause, is not prohibited by the Labor Act, it is unprotected and may be met with employer discipline.-
A. COX, D. BOK, R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 824 (9th ed. 1981) (citing NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939)). But see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (strike, in
violation of a no-strike clause, protesting serious unfair labor practices, was treated as protected activity).
In this Comment the unprotected activity referred to is an unauthorized work stoppage in violation of a
no-strike clause.
8. The higher duty refers to a greater responsibility to uphold the provisions of the bargaining agreement.
In these cases the courts refused to find that union officials had a greater responsibility to uphold the no-strike
clauses of their employment contracts in the absence of specific contract provisions imposing such a duty. In
Metropolitan Edison the court found that the collective-bargaining agreement did not impose an express duty on
the union officials to make attempts to halt an illegal work stoppage, and therefore the company committed an
unfair labor practice when it disciplined the officials more severely than others who participated in the strike.
663 F.2d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1981). The Hammermill court concluded that responsibilities of union stewards must
be determined by construing the employment contract and found no higher responsibilities of union stewards.
658 F.2d 155, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1981). In Heist the court held that a union steward did not have a higher
responsibility to cross a picket line in the absence of clear contractual language providing such a duty. 657 F.2d
178, 183 (7th Cir. 1981). In a recent decision the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that the collective-
bargaining process had imposed higher duties upon union officials, concluding that "the officials may be more
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however, the Seventh Circuit found that higher responsibilities of union of-
ficials justified disciplining them more severely than rank-and-file members
participating in the same unauthorized activity.' 0 The Indiana court did not
rely on the employment contract to find a higher duty owed by union stew-
ards. Rather, it referred to the contract to determine that the employees' acts
were in violation of a no-strike clause contained in the bargaining agree-
ment. " In Gould Inc. v. NLRB 2 the court construed the employment con-
tract to impose explicitly a higher duty on union stewards and held that the
employer did not commit an unfair labor practice when a union steward was
singled out for disciplinary discharge for having participated in an illegal work
stoppage with a number of rank-and-file employees. 3 Although the Gould
court relied on the duty imposed by the bargaining agreement, it based its
reasoning on the decision of the Indiana court. 14 The purpose of this
Comment is to examine what role an individual steward's responsibilities may
have in determining whether an employer has committed an unfair labor
practice by disciplining the steward more severely than a rank-and-file em-
ployee who participated in similar unprotected activity. More specifically,
this Comment will examine the nature of the duty, if any, that may be imposed
on a union steward by virtue of the position he holds. This examination will
consider the role of the contract in finding any so-called duty to take affirma-
tive action in the face of unprotected concerted activity and whether such a
duty may be found without a particular provision in the bargaining agreement.
II. BACKGROUND
The disparate-treatment cases arise when an employer disciplines a union
steward more harshly than a rank-and-file employee for participating in un-
protected activity, such as an illegal work stoppage. The applicable statutory
law in these cases is section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, which prohibits discrimination in any condition of employment that
would encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. t
Typically, the disciplined union steward files unfair labor practice charges
alleging the employer's violation of section 8(a)(3) and a derivative violation
harshly punished than the rank and file for their conduct in violation of the no-strike clause and an employer's
selective discipline of the offending union official will not constitute an unfair labor practice." Fournelle v.
NLRB, 109 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2441, 2448-49 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
9. 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
10. Id. at 232.
11. Id. at 228.
12. 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
13. Id. at 733.
14. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 66-72.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Section 8(a)(3) provides, in pertinent part:
§ 8. Unfair labor practices
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
[Vol. 43:379
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of section 8(a)(1). 16 The employer denies any violation and justifies any dis-
parate treatment by claiming that the steward failed to take affirmative action
in the face of unprotected union activity, that is, made no effort to terminate
the illegal work stoppage.
Section 8(a)(3) is frequently a subject of litigation in the labor arena and
presents "[t]he most vexing problems of statutory construction" ' 7 under the
National Labor Relations Act.' 8 An unfair labor practice charge grounded
primarily in section 8(a)(3) requires specifically that discrimination and a re-
sulting discouragement of union membership be found.' 9 Moreover, "dis-
crimination to discourage" has been construed to mean that the finding of a
violation normally turns on whether the discriminatory conduct was motivat-
ed by an antiunion purpose.20 In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers 21 the Supreme
Court considered these factors in establishing a two-tiered test to determine
when an employer's discriminatory conduct amounted to an unfair labor
practice:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct
was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof of antiunion
motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the
employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business con-
siderations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on em-
ployee rights is "comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be proved
to sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate
and substantial business justifications for the conduct.22
Therefore, to sustain an unfair labor practice charge under section 8(a)(3), an
antiunion motivation must be proved when the employer has offered "legit-
imate and substantial business justifications" for his conduct, unless the em-
ployer's discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of important
employee rights. When no antiunion motivation is alleged, a section 8(a)(3)
charge may be sustained by proving that an employer's discriminatory con-
duct is "inherently destructive" of important employee rights. In the dispar-
ate-treatment cases the courts have tended to focus their analyses on this first
part of the Great Dane test. 2 Whether disparate treatment of a union steward
is inherently destructive of employee rights depends to a large extent on
whether an employer is entitled to take into account any greater responsibility
16. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
§ 8. Unfair labor practices
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section
7] ....
Section 7 provides that '[e]mployees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations ... and to engage in other concerted activities for... mutual aid or protection .... " 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1976).
17. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 326 (1976).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-168, 171-182, 185-187 (1976).
19. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
20. Id.
21. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
22. Id. at 34.
23. See, e.g., C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981); Gould Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728
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owed by the steward, and hence greater fault on the part of a union steward
for failing to fulfill that responsibility.24
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) position on disparate treat-
ment of union stewards appears to have changed with its 1977 decision in
Precision Castings Co., 25 according to the Indiana court.26 Until then, stated
the court, "the Board ha[d] recognized that the higher responsibilities of
union officials justif[ied] disciplining them more severely than rank-and-file
members for participating in unprotected activity."2 z7  The Metropolitan
Edison, Hammermill, and Heist cases reflect the Board's position in Preci-
sion Castings, in which it found that the employer had committed an unfair
labor practice by disciplining stewards based on their status as union of-
ficers.28 The circuit courts upheld the Board's decision by finding no greater
duty attaching to one's status as a steward and hence no greater responsibility
on the part of union stewards.29
III. ANALYSIS
A. The NLRB Position
The NLRB's position 30 in the disparate-treatment cases is fairly clear-it
has refused to distinguish between harsher discipline because of one's union
membership status and harsher discipline because of greater responsibilities
24. See cases cited supra note 23.
25. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977).
26. 599 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1979).
27. Id.
28. 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 184 (1977).
29. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478, 482-83 (3d Cir. 1981); Hammermill Paper Co. v.
NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1981); C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178, 183 (7th Cir. 1981). In
Heist the court held that a steward's continued attempts to dissuade strikers were enough to satisfy his
obligation to uphold a no-strike clause. Id.
30. The discussion here refers to the NLRB majority position in the disparate-treatment cases, generally
reflected in the opinions of Chairman Fanning and members Jenkins and Murphy. These three members
composed the majority in Precision Castings Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 237
N.L.R.B. 226 (1978), enforcement denied, 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979); and Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881
(1978), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980). Fanning and Jenkins
composed the majority in C.H. Heist Corp., 250 N.L.R.B. 1400 (1980), enforced, 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981);
Hammermill Paper Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1980), enforced, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981); and Metropolitan
Edison Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1980), enforced 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
Member Penello dissented vigorously in Gould, Hammermill, and Metropolitan. MemberTruesdae dissented in
Gouldand Heist. Foran analysis of Penello's dissents, in which he argues that higher responsibilities are implied in
a no-strike clause, see infra text accompanying notes 136-57.
It is of interest that the composition of the Board has changed significantly since those decisions. Member
Murphy was replaced by Don A. Zimmerman, whose appointment expires December 16, 1985. Robert P.
Hunter, whose term expires August 27, 1985, replaced member Truesdale. Chairman Van de Water, serving an
interim appointment, replaced member Penello. Fanning and Jenkins are serving current appointments until
December 16, 1982, and August 27, 1983, respectively.
With three relatively new replacements, the Board's position in the disparate-treatment cases is uncertain.
After considering member Zimmerman's comments that the Board acted in a correct and responsible manner by
refusing to acquiesce in the court's unfriendly reception to Gould, however, it appears that he is aligned with
Fanning and Jenkins in this matter. 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 185 (1981) (speech at the Southwestern Legal Founda-
tion's 28th Annual Institute on Labor Law). With these comments in mind, there appears no reason why the
NLRB position in the disparate-treatment cases will change in the near future.
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attaching to one's union position as a steward or other official.3' In Precision
Castings Co. 32 and Gould Corp. 33 the Board found a violation of section
8(a)(3) when union stewards were disciplined for participating in an unlawful
strike, even in the presence of contract language that imposed greater duties
on the union stewards. 34 Precision Castings is the Board's leading case sup-
porting its position that a union steward who participates in an unauthorized
work stoppage may not be disciplined more severely than a rank-and-file
employee participating in the same activity. In that case the employer assert-
ed that under the contract stewards could be held to a greater degree of
accountability for participating in an unlawful strike.35 The Board rejected
this argument, holding that an employer's freedom to discipline "remained
unfettered so long as the criteria employed were not union-related." 36 The
stewards had not been active in leading the strike and were suspended solely
because they failed to urge the strikers to return to work.37 Therefore, the
Board held that the stewards had been discriminated against on the basis of
their union office and that this action was "contrary to the plain meaning of
Section 8(a)(3) and would frustrate the policies of the Act if allowed to
stand." 38
The NLRB reasserted the position it established in Precision Castings by
adopting the rulings of an administrative law judge in Indiana & Michigan
Electric Co. 39 The judge had concluded that the employer committed an
unfair labor practice by suspending five employees because they held the
position of union stewards. 4° The employer had disciplined the stewards more
severely than rank-and-file employees for participating in an illegal work
stoppage, contending that the stewards had a greater responsibility to uphold
the collective-bargaining agreement.4'
31. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co., 254 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1153 (1981); Metropolitan
Edison Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1980); Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 237
N.L.R.B. 226 (1978); Precision Castings Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977). But see, e.g., Rogate Indus., 246
N.L.R.B. 898 (1979) (Chairman Fanning and member Jenkins dissenting); Midwest Precision Castings Co., 244
N.L.R.B. 597 (1979) (three separate concurring opinions); Westinghouse Elec., 243 N.L.R.B. 306 (1979) (mem-
bers Truesdale and Penello found that the union stewards did not voluntarily participate in the strike).
32. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977).
33. 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890
(1980).
34. In Precision Castings the Board indicated that the administrative law judge "noted that a corollary
clause to the no-strike provision provided that the Union shall 'take all reasonable steps to restore normal
operations' in the event of a work stoppage." 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 183 (1977). For the contract duties explicitly
imposed in Gould, see infra note 69.
35. 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 183-84 (1977).
36. Id. at 183.
37. Id. at 183, 184 n.3. The Board was careful to distinguish mere participation from leading a strike, citing
J.P. Wetherby Constr. Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 690 (1970).
38. 233 N.L.R.B. 183, 184 (1977).
39. 237 N.L.R.B. 226 (1978), enforcement denied, 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979). Administrative Law Judge
Thomas R. Wilks held: "Contrary to Respondent, I find the Precision Castings case dispositive of the issues
herein." 237 N.L.R.B. 226, 229 (1978).
40. 237 N.L.R.B. 226, 229 (1978).
41. Id. at 228.
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In Gould Corp. the Board relied again on an administrative law judge's
application of Precision Castings to find that a steward had been unlawfully
discharged.42 According to the majority, the steward "was discharged not
because of his actions as an employee, but because of his lack of actions as a
steward, a legally impermissible criterion for discipline under the Act, and
one which is not validated by a contract clause that specifies the responsibil-
ities of union officers while acting as union officers." 43 In C.H. Heist Corp.
44
the Board similarly upheld an administrative law judge who found a section
8(a)(3) violation when an employee was disciplined "not because of his ac-
tions as an employee and his role in the strike but solely because he was also a
union official." 45 The administrative law judge relied on Precision Castings,
Gould Corp., and Indiana, in spite of the circuit courts' refusal to enforce the
latter two NLRB decisions.46
In Hammermill Paper Co.47 and Metropolitan Edison Co. 4S the NLRB
reiterated its holding in Precision Castings and did not find any greater re-
sponsibilities accompanying the status of union steward.49 Consistent with
these decisions, the NLRB upheld an administrative law judge in Miller
Brewing Co. 50 who had concluded that "[iln this case, as in Precision Cast-
ings, and its progeny, the very heart of the Board's rationale is that an em-
ployer may not rely on union-related considerations to justify a more severe
discipline for stewards.",
51
B. Greater Responsibilities, Greater Fault, and Greater Discipline of Union
Officials
The first federal court to apply the principle that union officials should be
held to a higher standard than rank-and-file union members in avoiding con-
tract violations was the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. NLRB. 52 The court applied the
Great Dane test 53 to determine whether the employer had violated sections
42. 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978).
43. Id. at 881.
44. 250 N.L.R.B. 1400 (1980), enforced, 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).
45. 250 N.L.R.B. 1400, 1404 (1980).
46. Id. at 1403.
47. 252 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1980), enforced, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981).
48. 252 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1980), enforced, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
49. 252 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1236 & n.4 (1980); 252 N.L.R.B. 1030, 1030 n.1 (1980).
50. 254 N.L.R.B. No. 24, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1153 (1981).
51. Id. at 1154.
52. 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979). Fifty members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
engaged in a work stoppage in violation of a no-strike clause in the union's contract with the employer electric
company. Five union stewards walked out with the rank-and-file employees after falsely informing their super-
visors they were ill. Three of the stewards returned to work that afternoon and joined in an effort to end the
strike; the other two did not. The rank-and-file employees received a written warning, the three stewards who
belatedly aided the effort to end the strike received a one-day suspension. None of the stewards helped to
organize or lead the walkout. Id. at 228-29.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
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8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act 54 by disciplining union
stewards more severely than rank-and-file employees for participation in an
unlawful strike. 55 Since the employer's business justifications were not con-
tested and there was no contention of antiunion motivation for the employer's
action, the issue before the court was whether the employer's conduct was
"inherently destructive of important employee rights."
56
The court determined adverse effect on employee rights by drawing a
distinction between legitimate activity of union officials and their unlawful
conduct, indicating that employer action that restricted the legitimate activity
of union officials and thereby discouraged members from holding union office
would have an inherently adverse effect on employee rights.57 The court
noted that "[t]he same is not true, however, of employer action that at most
deters union officials from deliberately engaging in clearly unlawful conduct
that is both a violation of their duties as employees and a repudiation of their
responsibilities as union officials." 58 The court distinguished discipline based
on union status from discipline based on responsibilities that accompany
union status, holding that the greater discipline meted out to the union
officials was based on their breach of the higher responsibilities that accom-
panied their status, "a breach that makes their misconduct more serious than
that of the rank-and-file." 59
The NLRB had found unlawful employer discrimination in Indiana &
Michigan Electric Co., 60 relying on its former reasoning in Precision Cast-
ings 61 that disparate discipline of union stewards violated section 8(a)(3). 2
The court of appeals in Indiana rejected the Board's arguments, reasoning
that Precision Castings was a departure from prior law and that previously the
Board had recognized that the higher responsibilities of union officials justi-
fied disciplining them more severely than rank-and-file members for par-
ticipating in unprotected activity. 63 The court concluded, most significantly,
that "the employer was entitled to take into account the union officials'
greater responsibility and hence greater fault, and that the resulting different
treatment of union officials could not be reasonably considered inherently
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (a)(1) (1976). For the text of the statute, see supra notes 15-16.
55. 599 F.2d 227, 228 (7th Cir. 1979).
56. Id. at 229, 230 & n.5.
57. Id. at 230.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 237 N.L.R.B. 226 (1978).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
62. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977).
63. 599 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1979). The court cited the following NLRB decisions to support this
contention: Chrysler Corp., Dodge Truck Plant, 232 N.L.R.B. 466 (1977); Super Valu Xenia, 228 N.L.R.B. 1254
(1977); J.P. Wetherby Constr. Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 690 (1970); Riviera Mfg. Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 772 (1967); Russell
Packing Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 194 (1961); University Overland Express, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 82 (1960); Stockham
Pipe Fittings Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 629 (1949). Foran analysis of the Indiana decision, see Note, Harsher Discipline
for Union Stewards than Rank-and-File for Participation in Illegal Strike Activity, 56 CHt.-KENT L. REV.
1175 (1980)
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destructive of important employee rights." 64 For use of Indiana as precedent,
it is significant that the court did not base its decision on any contract pro-
vision granting union officials greater responsibilities.65
Contractually imposed responsibilities of union officials were recognized
in Gould Inc. v. NLRB. 66 In Gould the Board had held that the employer
violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by singling out for discharge a union
steward who had participated with a number of rank-and-file union members
in an illegal work stoppage. 67 The Third Circuit refused to enforce the Board's
decision and adopted the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Indiana to hold that
the employer had not discriminated unlawfully against the union steward.
63
Furthermore, the court found that the discharged union steward had an ex-
plicit contractual duty to take affirmative steps to terminate the illegal work
stoppage. 69 The Third Circuit, following the Seventh Circuit, reasoned that a
discharge for breach of the duty to take affirmative action was not inherently
prejudicial of important employee rights and therefore did not amount to a
section 8(a)(3) violation. 70 The Gould court concluded that the only union
activity that would be deterred by its ruling was the seeking of union office in
order to thereafter "participate in illegal work stoppages or to repudiate
contractual obligations which were freely negotiated and voluntarily as-
sumed."0
1
64. 599 F.2d 227, 232 (7th Cir. 1979).
65. The court referred to the employment contract at two places. First, the court examined the no-strike
clause when referring to the illegal walkout: "This action violated Article III, § I of the collective-bargaining
agreement, which provides in relevant part as follows:
It is expressly understood and agreed that the services to be performed by the employees covered
by this Agreement pertain to and are essential to the operation of a public utility and to the welfare of a
public dependent thereon, and in consideration thereof and of the covenants and conditions herein by
the Company to be kept and performed (a) The International Brotherhood of Electric Workers and the
Local Union agree that the employees covered by this Agreement, or any of them will not be called
upon or permitted to cease or abstain from the continuous performance of the duties pertaining to the
positions held by them with the Company in accord with the terms of this agreement ......
Id. at 228.
The court also referred to the contract when mentioning the employer's business justifications. Id. at 229 &
n.4.
66. 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
67. Gould Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978).
68. 612 F.2d 728, 733 (3d Cir. 1979).
69. Id. Section 3 of the bargaining agreement specifically required union officials to take positive steps to
terminate unauthorized work stoppages:
In the event of an illegal, unauthorized or uncondoned strike, work stoppage, interruption or
impeding of work, the Local and International Union and its officers shall immediately take positive
and evident steps to have those involved cease such activity. These steps shall involve the following:
Within not more than twenty-four (24) hours after the occurrence of any such unauthorized action, the
Union, its officers and representatives shall publicly disavow same by posting a notice on the bulletin
boards throughout the plant. The Union, its officers and representatives shall immediately order its
members to return to work, notwithstanding the existence of any wild-cat picket line. The Union, its
officers and representatives shall refuse to aid or assist in any way such unauthorized action. The
Union, its officers and representatives will in good faith, use every reasonable effort to terminate such
unauthorized action.
Id. at 730 n.3.
70. Id. at 733.
71. Id.
[Vol. 43:379
1982] DISPARATE TREATMENT OF UNION STEWARDS 387
In Gould the Third Circuit applied the principle that a union official may
be disciplined more severely than rank-and-file members participating in sim-
ilar unlawful activity, but departed from Indiana to the extent that Gould
looked to a specific contractual provision to find a greater responsibility on
the part of union officials. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit itself appeared to
restrict its decision in Indiana by enforcing a Board order in C.H. Heist Corp.
v. NLRB.7 2
C. The Departure from Indiana
In Heist the Seventh Circuit upheld a Board decision 7 that an employer
had violated section 8(a)(3) by discharging an employee who participated in a
contractually prohibited work stoppage, when the discharge was because the
employee was a union steward at the time of the illegal walkout. 74 The court
concluded that the company's action was destructive of the employee's right
to hold union office.75
In Heist the court did not find that the discharge of the union steward was
a result of antiunion motivation. Rather, the issue again facing the court was
whether the discharge was "inherently destructive of important employee
rights." 76 The court acknowledged its previous decision in Indiana by noting
that "[i]f the discharge was 'not based merely on the officials' status but upon
their breach of the higher responsibilities that accompany that
status,' . . . then it is not inherently destructive of employee rights."
''
Focusing its attention on the lack of a definition of "higher responsibility,"
the court held that the discharged steward had met his obligation to uphold the
no-strike clause by repeatedly attempting to dissuade the strikers.76 The court
found the discharge inherently destructive of employee rights in general, in-
dicating that "[ilt is sufficient that the employer's actions have a substantial
tendency to discourage employees from holding union office or engaging in
other protected activities." 
79
In light of its holding in Indiana, it is significant that the Heist court
looked only to the employment contract to impose higher responsibilities on
union officials. The court did not object to higher responsibilities imposed by
the bargaining agreement; had the contract been as specific in imposing a duty
as that in Gould, the court apparently would have upheld the discharge.80 For
some unexplained reason, the Heist court justified its reliance solely on the
72. 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).
73. 250 N.L.R.B. 1400 (1980).
74. 657 F.2d 178, 183 (7th Cir. 1981).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 182.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 182, 183.
79. Id. at 183.
80. Id. at 182. 'The collective-bargaining provision [sic] in Gould Inc.... were quite specific and would
alone be sufficient to impose a higher responsibility upon the union officials to end the strike." Id. See also
supra note 69.
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contract language by construing the no-strike clause58 in Indiana as establish-
ing a steward's higher responsibilities.8 2 It then distinguished Heist from
Indiana by indicating that "[t]he contractual basis for the union steward's
'higher responsibility' in this case is even more tenuous than in Indiana &
Michigan Electric Co.,", 
3
At this point the Heist court retreated completely from its reasoning in
Indiana. At no time in Indiana did the court look to the employment contract
to determine a higher responsibility of union officials to refrain from unlawful
conduct. Rather, the Indiana court based its holding on prior NLRB decisions
and its view of the law that the higher responsibilities of union officials justi-
fied disciplining them more severely than rank-and-file members for partici-
pating in unprotected activity. 84 The court quoted the no-strike clause in
Indiana merely to show that the strike activity in which approximately fifty
members participated, including the union stewards, was in violation of the
bargaining agreement, and hence unprotected activity.85
The Heist court further complicated the holding in Indiana when it found
that the contractual basis for a union steward's higher responsibilities was
more tenuous than in Indiana.6 As pointed out, the Indiana court did not rely
on the contract language to impose a greater duty on union stewards.
s7
Furthermore, even if Indiana had been decided on the contract language, it is
inconceivable that the Heist court could find less of a duty in that case than in
Indiana. In addition to a no-strike clause, 8s the Heist contract contained a
specific provision indicating that the "steward's duties shall consist of seeing
that all terms and conditions of the Agreement are being complied with." 
8 9
Heist completely undermined the holding in Indiana when the court essential-
ly held that a specific contractual provision requiring the steward to cross the
picket line would have been necessary to sustain the discharge. 90 Without
such a specific contractual requirement, the court held that the stewards
81. See supra note 65.
82. 657 F.2d 178, 182 (7th Cir. 1981).
83. Id.
84. 599 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1979).
85. Id. at 228.
86. 657 F.2d 178, 182 (7th Cir. 1981).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
88. Article XXI Dispute/Grievance Procedure:
Section 5. There shall be no strike or lockout, slowdown, interference, or work interruption on
any job over any grievance or dispute while it is being processed through this grievance procedure, and
until the said procedure has been exhausted. If any employees engage in any such activity, they may be
disciplined by management, without recourse except to establish that they actually participated in or
were a part of such activity ....
657 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
89. Article ViII Stewards:
Section 1. The Union shall have the right to appoint one chief shop steward ... [who] shall be
(and [sic] employee] covered by this Agreement ....
Section 2. The steward's duties shall consist of seeing that all terms and conditions of the Agree-
ment are being complied with ....
657 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1981).
90. 657 F.2d 178, 183 (7th Cir. 1981).
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fulfilled their obligation to the contract by attempting to dissuade other strik-
ers. 9' This is inconsistent with Indiana, in which the mere participation of
stewards in the unlawful activity justified their more severe punishment, al-
though it should be noted that the punishment in Indiana was suspension 92" as
opposed to discharge in Heist.93
It appears that the Seventh Circuit retreated from its former findings at
law of a greater responsibility of union stewards and that mere participation in
unlawful activity was sufficient to justify more severe punishment of union
stewards than rank-and-file employees participating in the same unlawful ac-
tivity. In Heist the greater responsibilities of a union steward, to the extent
the court recognized any, were defined only by the employment contract and
were fulfilled by a steward who participated in the unlawful activity, but made
some attempts to induce other employees on the picket line to return to
work.94 The Seventh Circuit shifted its focus from that of justifying disparate
treatment of a union steward for participating in unprotected activity because
of greater responsibilities accompanying his union status to that of determin-
ing unlawful treatment by specific contract language and any affirmative acts
by the steward.
While the Seventh Circuit was busy chipping away at its own decision in
Indiana, the Third Circuit was also fashioning law concerning the disparate
treatment of union stewards. Previously, the Third Circuit in Gould had relied
on the reasoning in Indiana to uphold the discharge of a union steward who
failed to fulfill his contractual obligation to take affirmative steps to end an
unauthorized work stoppage. 9 But in Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB96 the
Third Circuit did not uphold the discharge of a union steward who had partici-
pated in illegal strike activity. 97 In that case, while other employees with no
record of disciplinary problems were suspended, the union steward, who also
had a clean record, was discharged for his failure to take affirmative action as
a union representative in the face of activity in violation of the bargaining
agreement. 98 The Hammermill court refused to look beyond the language of
the contract to impose any higher responsibilities on the union steward and
concluded that "whether responsibility does, or does not, accompany the
status of union stewardship is a conclusion that must be reached by constru-
ing the contract, rather than a condition dictated purely by operation of
law." 99 The court held that the no-strike clause, which stated "The Union
agrees that there will be no strikes, slowdowns, or work stoppages,'"00 did
91. Id.
92. 599 F.2d 227, 229 (7th Cir. 1979).
93. 657 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 1981).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
96. 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981).
97. Id. at 163.
98. Id. at )56.
99. Id. at 164.
10o. Id.
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not impose a higher duty on union stewards and refused further interpretation
of the contract language on the ground that the arbitrator made specific find-
ings that negated the inference that higher responsibilities accompanied the
union steward position.' 0'
The court reached this decision in Hammermill by relying on Gould and
Indiana. That reliance, however, was ill-placed to the extent the underlying
analysis rested on Indiana. The Hammermill court indicated that the Indiana
court found a higher responsibility and greater fault of union stewards from
the language of the employment contract.'02 As indicated previously, the
Indiana court relied on the contract to show only that the employees' strike
was unprotected activity.'0 3 Despite language to the contrary, 1' 4 the
Hammermill court implicitly recognized the inconsistency of relying on
Indiana: "Indiana thus suggests a short step beyond Gould. It allows a court
to find that an employee's status as a union official carries responsibilities to
take affirmative steps to prevent unlawful work stoppages, even absent the
emphatic and unmistakably clear language of individual duty in Gould" 105
Concurring Judge Higginbotham was more explicit: "Insofar as the Seventh
Circuit based its conclusion on the theory that a union steward's status con-
veyed rights and responsibilities, not specifically enumerated in the contract,
which justified more severe discipline, I would reject its decision com-
pletely." 106
The Third Circuit considered another disparate-discipline case in Metro-
politan Edison Co. v. NLRB,'07 in which it upheld the Board's decision that
an employer violated section 8(a)(3) by disciplining the union president and
vice president more harshly than rank-and-file members for participating in an
illegal work stoppage in violation of the no-strike clause' 08 in the bargaining
agreement. '09 The officials made attempts to get the employees to return to
work, but would not cross the picket line as the employer requested. "o Again
the Third Circuit relied only on the contract language to determine higher
responsibilities of union officials: "If the collective bargaining agreement
101. Id. at 165.
102. Id. at 164-65.
Thus the contract ... provided that employees will not be called upon or permitted to cease or abstain
from the continuous performance of their jobs. 599 F.2d at 228 (emphasis supplied). By use of this
language, the contract implicitly differentiated between two tiers of union membership-those who
could engage in strike activity, and those who could wield the additional power to promote or deter
strike activity by others-and imposed higher duties on members of the latter tier.
Id.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
104. "'Thus, the result we reach is not at all inconsistent with Gould and Indiana." 658 F.2d 155, 165 (3d
Cir. 1981).
105. 658 F.2d 155, 164 (3d Cir. 1981).
106. Id. at 167 (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
107. 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
108. The contract provision was as follows: "The Brotherhood and its members agree... there shall be
no strikes or walkouts by the Brotherhood or its members ... it being the desire of both parties to provide
uninterrupted and continuous service to the public." Id. at 480.
109. Id. at 483.
110. Id. at 480-81.
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does not specify that union officials have some responsibility to try to end an
illegal work stoppage, then the company may not impose any greater disci-
pline on union officials than on other participants in the strike." "' The court
reasoned that imposing disparate treatment in a case such as this puts the
union official in an untenable position-either obey the company and lose
authority, or follow his own judgment and risk harsher punishment." 2 Be-
cause of this dilemma the court held that it would not interpret a collective-
bargaining agreement "to impose additional responsibilities on union officials
absent clear language showing that the union agreed to it." 113 It is significant
that the Metropolitan Edison court reached this decision in light of two pre-
vious arbitration decisions justifying disparate treatment of union leaders who
participated in an illegal work stoppage. 114
The Metropolitan Edison court did not attempt to reconcile its decision
with that of the Seventh Circuit in Indiana. In a footnote the court indicated
that to the extent Indiana was inconsistent with Gould, Heist, and Hammer-
mill, they declined to follow it. "5 This appears to be a clear indication that the
Third Circuit intends to recognize only explicit, contractually imposed higher
responsibilities of union stewards.
D. The Reappearance and Continued Vitality of Indiana
Even in the Seventh Circuit Indiana would appear to have diminished
import after Heist, 116 yet less than a month after that decision the Seventh
Circuit turned to Indiana to uphold the discharge of union officials in Cater-
pillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB. "i7 In Caterpillar the court concluded that a strike
held by employees was a breach of the collective-bargaining agreement and
therefore could not be considered protected activity. "8 The company dis-
charged three employees, two of whom were union officials, for taking part in
the strike. "9 In reaching a decision to discharge the company used the follow-
ing criteria: "(1) front line activity during the strike; (2) active confrontation
involving either impeding entry to the plant or other words or actions against
management during the strike; (3) presence on the scene during most of the
S111. Id. at 482.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 483.
114. The arbitrators had interpreted contract language identical to that in the instant case and held that
more severe discipline of union officials than rank-and-file members for participating in an illegal work stoppage
was justified. The court quoted one of the arbitrators:
It is well-established that Union officials have an affirmative duty to protect the authority of the
Union leadership from illegitimate action on the part of employees, and to uphold the sanctity of the
Agreement and its established grievance procedures. Failure to exercise this responsibility subjects
them to more serious penalties. Indeed, the mere participation by Union leaders in an illegal work
stoppage is sufficient to justify a differential penalty ....
Id. (emphasis in original). The court held, quite simply, that it was not bound by previous arbitrator interpreta-
tions. Id.
115. Id. at 478, 482 n. 1.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 72-94.
117. 658 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1981).
118. Id. at 1248.
119. Id. at 1245.
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strike; (4) union officers with incumbent responsibilities to avert or dis-
courage wildcat activities." "0
Contrary to its decision in Heist, the Seventh Circuit in Caterpillar
seemed to indicate that higher responsibilities may be imposed on union offi-
cials even in the absence of clear contract language providing such duties.,2
Even though there was no contract provision specifically imposing upon
union officials the duty to "avert or discourage wildcat activities," the court
refused to enforce that portion of the Board order 22 which held that the
company had violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by discharging the officials
for failure to fulfill their higher incumbent responsibilities.'3 Although the
court mentioned that four criteria were utilized in discharging the employ-
ees,' 24 it quoted with approval that portion of the Indiana opinion indicating
that an employer is entitled to take into account a union official's greater
responsibility and greater fault. '5 Therefore, it appeared that the Seventh
Circuit revived Indiana in Caterpillar as quickly as it departed from it in
Heist.
At least one other circuit has relied on Indiana to uphold harsher dis-
cipline of union officials for participating in an illegal work stoppage because
of responsibilities attaching to their union office. In NLRB v. Armour-Dial,
Inc. 126 the Eighth Circuit upheld suspensions of union executive committee
members "not because of their status as union officers but because of their
acts and omissions to act while holding union office." l27 The union president
had threatened a work stoppage and was suspended after a forklift operator
and three members of the executive committee refused to unload an Iowa
Beef Products (IBP) truck because employees of the IBP plant were on
strike. 12' The president was suspended for ninety days; executive committee
members received nine-day suspensions. 29 One rank-and-file employee who
refused to operate the forklift was also suspended. "0
The president's suspension was not contested at the appellate court level.
The court relied on Indiana and Gould to uphold the suspensions of the
executive committee members,' 3' rejecting the Board's argument that the
120. Id.
121. See supra text accompanying note 90.
122. 250 N.L.R.B. 527 (1980).
123. 658 F.2d 1242, 1249 (7th Cir. 1981).
124. Id. at 1248. See also supra text accompanying note 120.
125. 658 F.2d 1242, 1249 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 227, 232
(7th Cir. 1979) ). See supra text accompanying note 64. When citing Indiana, the Caterpillar court noted that
"this court-upheld the discharging of certain employees who had engaged in an illegal strike, when the sole
criterion was their union status." 658 F.2d 1242, 1249 (7th Cir. 1981). In Indiana, however, the court upheld a
less serious suspension of the union officials, not theirdischarge. The Seventh Circuit specifically pointed to this
fact in a footnote in Heist. 657 F.2d 178, 182 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981).
126. 638 F.2d 51 (8th Cir. 1981).
127. Id. at 55.
128. Id. at 54.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. The court quoted significant portions of the Indiana decision, including the following: "As the Board
said in [its prior] cases, union officials are subject to 'an even greater duty than the rank-and-file employees to
uphold [the contract] provisions."' Id. at 55.
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case at bar should be distinguished since none of the officials had participated
in or induced the work stoppages. 32 The Armour court found that the com-
mittee members' presence at the meetings between the union and the com-
pany, in addition to their acquiescence in the position espoused by the pres-
ident, amounted to "participation in and inducement of the work stoppage
that followed." "3' The court continued: "The role the committee played in
inducing the work stoppage will not be overlooked even though the committee
members chose to communicate their support in a non-verbal manner." '14 It
is apparent that the Armour court looked hard to find "participation in and
inducement of" the work stoppage. Although this case ultimately may be
distinguished from Indiana, in which mere participation justified greater dis-
cipline, it is clear that the Armour court did not rely on a specific contract
provision to impose greater responsibilities on union officials.'35
IV. GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES ABSENT
SPECIFIC CONTRACT PROVISIONS
The NLRB majority appears committed to the rule of Precision Castings
Co. 136 that a union steward who participates in an unauthorized work stop-
page may not be disciplined more severely than a rank-and-file employee for
participating in the same activity. 37 That principle, however, is not unchal-
lenged. Not only did the Seventh Circuit implicitly, if not explicitly, overrule
that Board decision in Indiana, 38 but former NLRB member Penello, "9 in a
series of dissents, attacked vigorously the majority's reliance on Precision
Castings.
In his dissent to Gould Corp. 4o Penello pointed out that the steward's
duties to take affirmative action to end an unauthorized strike were contrac-
tually imposed in that case ' 4' and also distinguished discipline based on union
status from discipline based on a failure to fulfill responsibilities that ac-
company union status. 42 In making this distinction, Penello drew an analogy
to benefits received by a steward by virtue of his union position, 143 indicating
132. Id.
133. Id. at 56.
134. Id.
135. The court looked to the employment contract only to describe the unauthorized activity of the
disciplined employees. The no-strike clause is as follows: "[S]hould trouble of any kind arib. in the plant, there
shall be no strike stoppage, slowdown, suspension of work or boycott on the part of the Union or its members or
the employees .... - Id. at 53.
136. 233 N.L.R.B. 183 (1977).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 30-51.
138. 599 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1979).
139. See supra note 30.
140. 237 N.L.R.B. 881 (1978), enforcement denied, 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890
(1980).
141. 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 884 (1978). See also supra note 69.
142. 237 N.L.R.B. 881, 883-84 (1978).
143. Id. at 884. Penello argued this position as follows:
According to the majority's analysis, an employee who becomes a union steward acquires a battery of
benefits and protections without an iota of burdens or responsibilities in return. For I am certain that
my colleagues would not question the accepted principle that union stewards who are engaged in the
processing of grievances may engage in conduct which otherwise would be unprotected by the Act.
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that those benefits that are granted "solely because of the employee's position
in the union" 144 do not give rise to an unfair labor practice. Penello also
looked to the sanctity of the grievance-arbitration, no-strike tradeoff, as man-
dated by Congress in the National Labor Relations Act, to support the notion
of an affirmative duty of union stewards. 145 Finally, Penello argued that a long
line of arbitrator's decisions has established the duty of the union steward to
prevent or terminate illegal work stoppages'4 and cited cases relied on by the
Indiana court to support the position that union stewards have a greater duty
than rank-and-file employees to uphold the provisions of a collective-bargain-
ing agreement, particularly the no-strike clause of the agreement.' 47
Penello expanded his analysis of a steward's inherently imposed duties in
his concurring opinion in Midwest Precision Castings Co.'48 and his dissent to
Metropolitan Edison Co. 49 In Midwest Penello looked to the steward as an
authority figure, a leader on any issue that arises in the plant on a daily
basis. 5 ' Because the steward holds this position of authority, by his mere
participation in an unauthorized work stoppage he "should be viewed as the
Nor would they dispute the principle that the maintenance and enforcement of a clause in a collective-
bargaining agreement granting union stewards superseniority for the purposes of layoff and recall over
the rest of the employees in the bargaining unit is lawful. Such benefits or protections are granted solely
because of the employee's position in the union and for the purpose of properly administering the
collective-bargaining agreement. However, when a union steward is disciplined because he has im-
properly administered the collective-bargaining agreement by failing to fulfill a duty inherent in his
position and which would not exist but for his union position my colleagues are quick to find a violation
on the part of the employer.
Id. (emphasis in original).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 884-85. Penello indicated that "the fundamental importance of the grievance arbitration system
and its companion no-strike agreement to the peaceful settlement of labor-management disputes, as mandated
by Congress, applied by the courts and the Board, and consistently interpreted by a long line of arbitral
authority, will be seriously undermined" by the majority's decision. Id. at 883.
146. Id. at 885-86, 885 n.15.
147. Id. at 886. See supra note 63.
148. 244 N.L.R.B. 597 (1979).
149. 252 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1980), enforced, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 198 i), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
150. 244 N.L.R.B. 597, 600 (1979). Penello argued the following:
By the very nature of his position with the union a steward occupies a position of some authority
vis-a-vis his fellow employees, and those employees will of necessity look towards the steward for
guidance and leadership on any issue which arises on a daily basis in the plant. For example, if an
employee is called by his employer to attend an investigatory interview which the employee reasonably
believes may result in disciplinary action the employee has a federally protected right to request the
presence of his union steward at such an interview. Or if an employee has a grievance regarding some
action taken by management against him the collective-bargaining agreement will, in most cases,
require him to seek out his union steward for advice and assistance in processing the grievance. And if
an employee merely has a question concerning the interpretation of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment he will naturally seek the assistance of his union steward. In the same manner, if employees are
contemplating the withholding of their services from their employer by engaging in a work stoppage or
work slowdown they perforce will seek the advice of and guidance of their union steward on a matter of
such crucial importance to their employment. If under such circumstances a union steward joins his
fellow employees in an illegal, unauthorized work stoppage logic dictates that the steward should be
viewed as the "leader" of such a work stoppage.
Id. at 600-01.
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'leader' of such a work stoppage." 15t Penello concluded that "the effect
caused by a union steward who fails to urge employees who are engaged in an
illegal, unauthorized work stoppage to return to work is no different from the
effect caused by a union steward who affirmatively instigates or leads an
illegal, unauthorized work stoppage." 1
5 2
It is apparent that Penello would not require a union steward to exercise
any active leadership in an unauthorized work stoppage in order to justify his
more severe punishment. Furthermore, in Metropolitan Edison he made clear
that some affirmative action to end an unlawful strike does not fulfill the
steward's duty to enforce the no-strike clause of the bargaining agreement by
crossing the picket line. 5 3 Finally, Penello would hold that higher responsibil-
ities of union officials need not be spelled out under the contract and that
implicit in any no-strike clause is a negative duty not to participate in any
unlawful work stoppage and an affirmative duty to take action to bring any
strike in violation of the no-strike clause to an end. 1
54
Penello's series of dissents outlines his position that union officials have
more rigorous responsibilities to uphold the provisions of a bargaining agree-
ment. Clearly, in his view, a union steward has a greater responsibility to
uphold the no-strike clause of ari employment contract than do rank-and-file
employees. The greater responsibilities need not be specified explicitly in the
contract; rather, they are inherent in the union official's position. Because of
the implicit duties arising from the no-strike clause not to participate in an
unauthorized work stoppage and to take affirmative steps to end an unauthor-
ized strike, a striking steward has not fulfilled his duties when he takes some
affirmative steps to end the unauthorized strike. Therefore, mere participa-
tion by a union steward in an unauthorized strike justifies imposing greater
discipline on him than on rank-and-file employees.
151. Id. at 601.
152. Id. at 602.
153. 252 N.L.R.B. 1030, 1031 (1980).
154. Id. Penello described these duties as follows:
Furthermore, I note that in cases like this union officials typically have two different duties under
the contract. The first is a negative duty, which is usually explicitly stated in the contract but is implicit
in any no-strike clause, that the union will refrain from breaching its no-strike agreement. Mere
participation by a union official in a strike in violation of a no-strike clause would breach this negative
duty. The second duty is an affirmative duty that the union, through its officials, will take affirmative
action to bring any strike in violation of the no-strike clause to an end. This affirmative duty may be
explicitly stated in the contract, as it was in Gould, or may merely be implicit in the no-strike provi-
sions of the contract, as in the case here. As this case illustrates, it is possible for a union official to
comply with one duty without necessarily fulfilling his obligations under the other duty. Logically, the
negative duty should take precedence. Thus, I would find that, regardless of what other actions are
taken by a union official, he has responsibility to refrain from participating in a strike in violation of the
ro-strike clause. Of course, even if a union official does not participate in the unlawful strike, he may
still fail to fulfill his responsibilities if he does not take steps to end the strike, in cases where the
contract imposes such a duty either explicitly or implicitly. However, I would find that, at the very
least, any no-strike agreement imposes upon union officials a negative duty to refrain from participat-
ing in an unlawful strike.
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The Indiana court adopted the general reasoning that a union steward
could be punished more severely than rank-and-file employees because of his
greater responsibilities,'55 but the majority of courts in the disparate-treat-
ment cases have not been willing to distinguish between punishment based on
higher responsibilities and punishment because of union status. 156 Further-
more, when a greater responsibility of union officials has been recognized, it
is only when it has been imposed specifically by the contract, and some
affirmative acts on the part of the official have served to fulfill those respon-
sibilities. 57 Whether the courts will go as far in finding a greater responsibility
of union stewards as Penello would have them go remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
In determining whether disparate treatment of a union official for partic-
ipation in an unauthorized strike amounts to an unfair labor practice, the
courts have been inconsistent in their application of the principle that the
higher responsibilities of union stewards justify their greater punishment.
Indiana imposes a greater duty on union officials than on rank-and-file
employees to uphold the provisions of the contract. 158 Because of the higher
responsibilities that accompany union status, a union steward who partic-
ipates in a work stoppage that is in violation of a no-strike clause in the
bargaining agreement may be disciplined more severely than a rank-and-file
employee. The Seventh Circuit did not require instigation or leadership by the
steward, nor did it require explicit contract provisions imposing a duty on the
official; rather, harsher treatment was justified for mere participation in un-
protected activity because of greater fault on the part of the union steward.' 59
This broad rule was narrowed considerably after C.H. Heist Corp. v.
NLRB, '60 in which the Seventh Circuit looked solely to the employment
contract to define higher responsibilities of union officials. 16' Absent a specif-
ic contract provision to the contrary, higher responsibilities do not require a
steward to cross a picket line, but may be fulfilled by some attempts to induce
employees to return to work. A steward's mere participation in the unlawful
activity is not sufficient to justify harsher punishment.
After Heist it appeared that the Seventh Circuit would determine higher
responsibilities of union officials only by construing the employment contract,
but then the court upheld the discharge of union officials in Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. NLRB 62 by relying on its analysis in Indiana.'63 In light of the
155. See supra text accompanying notes 52-65.
156. See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981); Hammermill Paper Co. v.
NLRB, 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981).
157. See, e.g., C.H. Heist Corp. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 52-65.
159. Id.
160. 657 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1981).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 72-94.
162. 658 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1981).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 116-25.
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Heist decision, however, it would appear unwise for an employer to rely on
Indiana in discharging a union official for his greater fault in participating in a
wildcat strike, especially if the steward had made some attempts to induce
striking employees to return to work and there was no contract provision
imposing explicit duties on a steward. 64
From its initial decision in Gould Inc. v. NLRB' 65 the Third Circuit has
looked to the employment contract to determine greater responsibilities of
union officials, even though the Gould court relied on Indiana to reach its
holding.'66 In Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB' 67 the discharge of a union
official on the ground that he had failed to take affirmative action as a union
representative in the face of concerted action in violation of the bargaining
agreement was a violation of section 8(a)(3) when the contract imposed no
greater duties on the union steward.' 68 Again, in Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
NLRB' 69 the court would not sustain a discharge of union officials when
higher responsibilities had not been imposed explicitly on the officials by the
contract. 170
The Third Circuit, then, has been more consistent than the Seventh Cir-
cuit in its determination of a union official's higher responsibilities. Clearly,
that circuit will oppose greater discipline of union officials who participate in
unprotected activity to the same degree as rank-and-file employees, unless a
contract provision specifically imposes greater duties on the officials. After
Heist it is not clear to what extent the Seventh Circuit will look beyond the
employment contract in defining higher responsibilities of union officials, but
it appears that some affirmative acts on the part of union officials will fulfill
any greater obligations they may have under the contract.
Therefore, it is apparent that some courts have followed the Board's lead
and have been unwilling to differentiate between discipline based on higher
responsibilities and discipline based on union status, simply calling any dis-
parate treatment of union stewards a section 8(a)(3) violation except when
duties are explicit in the employment contract. Even when such a distinction
is made, the extent to which a union official may have greater responsibilities
by virtue of his union position, outside those explicitly imposed by the em-
ployment contract, is unclear. Former NLRB member Penello argued vig-
orously that a union official's position bestows greater responsibilities upon
him. '7' To achieve some consistency in the disparate-treatment cases in which
no contractual duties are explicitly imposed, the courts must first decide
164. See supra text accompanying notes 72-94.
165. 612 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
167. 658 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1981).
168. Id. at 163.
169. 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2926 (1982).
170. Id. at 482.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 137-57.
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whether discipline based on union status may be distinguished from discipline
based on higher responsibilities accompanying union status. Second, the
courts must recognize how these higher responsibilities may be defined-
whether they may only be imposed specifically, or whether, as member
Penello suggested, higher duties are implicit in a no-strike clause.
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